Controversial elements:Priority disputes and the discovery of chemical elements by Kragh, Helge Stjernholm
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Controversial elements
Kragh, Helge Stjernholm
Published in:
Substantia
DOI:
10.13128/Substantia-740
https://doi.org/10.13128/Substantia-740
Publication date:
2019
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Kragh, H. S. (2019). Controversial elements: Priority disputes and the discovery of chemical elements.
Substantia, 3(2), 79-90. https://doi.org/10.13128/Substantia-740, https://doi.org/10.13128/Substantia-740
Download date: 04. Feb. 2020
Substantia. An International Journal of the History of Chemistry 3(2) Suppl. 5: 79-90, 2019
Firenze University Press 
www.fupress.com/substantia
ISSN 2532-3997 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/Substantia-740
Citation: H. Kragh (2019) Controver-
sial Elements: Priority Disputes and 
the Discovery of Chemical Elements. 
Substantia 3(2) Suppl. 5: 79-90. doi: 
10.13128/Substantia-740
Copyright: © 2019 H. Kragh. This is 
an open access, peer-reviewed article 
published by Firenze University Press 
(http://www.fupress.com/substantia) 
and distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medi-
um, provided the original author and 
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All rel-
evant data are within the paper and its 
Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The Author(s) 
declare(s) no conflict of interest.
Controversial Elements: 
Priority Disputes and the Discovery of 
Chemical Elements
Helge Kragh
Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen, Blegdamsvej 17, Copenhagen, Denmark.
E-mail: helge.kragh@nbi.ku.dk
Abstract.  There are only a limited number of chemical elements and to be credited 
with the discovery of a new one is therefore considered of great importance. Adding 
to the honour and fame is that traditionally the discoverer has the right to name the 
element in question. For these and other reasons, element discoveries are often fol-
lowed by controversies regarding priority. While some of these are contemporary with 
the discovery process, others occur much later and are attempts to rewrite history. 
But what is a scientific discovery, more precisely, and why does it sometimes become 
controversial? From a scientific point of view, does it really matter who is recognised 
for the discovery of a new element? These are some of the questions considered in the 
paper, together with a few concrete cases from the history of chemistry. As shown by 
the recent disputes concerning the discoveries of synthetic elements at the end of the 
periodic system, modern priority disputes differ in some ways from the disputes of the 
past. On the other hand, there are also significant similarities.
Keywords.Discovery, chemical elements, controversy, priority, periodic system.
1. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this paper is priority controversies related to the discover-
ies of chemical elements. In order to discuss the subject rationally it will be 
useful to introduce and clarify the meaning of two key terms, namely “dis-
covery” and “priority controversy,” in a general way that does not necessar-
ily relate to the chemists’ elements. These are concepts that are often taken 
for granted, but scientists, philosophers and historians actually use them 
with different meanings, such as will be discussed in the following two sec-
tions. Nor is the meaning of “element” self-evident as it has changed through 
different phases of history to be explicated in Section 4, where a historical 
classification of element discoveries is suggested. In the last sections I look 
at aspects of three discovery cases from different periods and with different 
characteristics. The chosen cases are aluminium from the pre-Mendeleev 
era, lutetium from the early twentieth century, and nobelium from the tran-
suranic age. 
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2. WHAT IS A SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY?
Much of the discussion about scientific discover-
ies can be traced back to different conceptions of what 
constitutes a discovery.1 It is generally assumed that a 
scientist (or a group of scientists) has discovered X if he 
or she has convincingly established that X exists or is the 
case. X may be an object, a phenomenon, or a significant 
relation between empirical data. In the latter case it may 
consist of a structural organisation of data, where all or 
some of the data may be known in advance. An example 
from the history of chemistry is the Dulong-Petit law of 
1819 correlating the specific heats of elements and their 
atomic weights. Another and more important example is 
Mendeleev’s periodic system fifty years later. Although 
Mendeleev’s system did not originally rely on new dis-
coveries of objects and their properties, he discovered 
the system in the constructive sense that he organised 
known data into a new conceptual framework.
It may seem obvious that only objects which real-
ly exist can be discovered. When we say that William 
Ramsay and Lord Rayleigh discovered argon in 1894, it 
implies that argon really exists as a component of the 
atmosphere. As the philosopher Peter Achinstein has 
argued, truth and discovery go together: “Discovering 
something requires the existence of what is discovered. 
You cannot discover what doesn’t exist.”2 Of course, one 
can claim to have discovered a non-existing object, and 
the claim may even be broadly accepted for a period 
of time, but in that case the claim does not count as a 
proper discovery. 
Although Achinstein’s view may seem to be com-
mon sense, from a historical perspective it is problematic 
to reserve the category of discovery for what is presently 
accepted as true. From this perspective one may legiti-
mately speak of the discovery of non-existing objects or 
phenomena, namely if the discovery claim received wide 
recognition at the time it was announced. Phlogiston 
does not exist and yet the substance was believed to exist 
for half a century or so. It makes sense to say that Georg 
E. Stahl discovered phlogiston in about 1720 and also 
that Joseph Black discovered the heat substance called 
caloric in the 1730s. These non-existing entities were 
discovered and later de-discovered. There is another rea-
son why Achinstein’s claim is problematic, namely that 
it seems to presuppose that objects exist in nature prior 
to their discovery. But there are objects, such as the arti-
ficially produced superheavy elements, that only come 
into existence with their discovery. The so far heaviest 
known element, oganesson with atomic number 118, was 
not discovered because it existed. It exists because it was 
discovered.
A chemical element is not a specific and localisable 
object of the same kind as, say, a planet. The chemist 
cannot point to a piece of sodium and claim that “this 
is sodium” in the same sense as the astronomer can 
point to a planet and claim that “this is Neptune.” On 
the other hand, to say that something is or contains the 
element sodium involves the concept of an element, just 
like the identification of Neptune as a planet involves 
the concept of a planet. The discovery of a new element 
is thus to demonstrate convincingly the elemental nature 
of some substance, which is a conceptual discovery, and 
also to find this substance in nature – or perhaps to syn-
thesize it in the laboratory. The latter is an empirical dis-
covery.
For something to be a discovery it is normally 
assumed that it must be a novelty, and for this rea-
son it cannot be made twice at different times. On the 
other hand, there are many examples in the history of 
science of so-called rediscoveries, a concept which typi-
cally refers to insights that originally attracted very little 
attention and at a later time were unknowingly dupli-
cated.3 The rediscovery will almost always be in a differ-
ent form than the original discovery. An example from 
the history of chemistry is provided by the discovery of 
vanadium, which was first isolated by Andrés Manuel 
del Río in 1801 and rediscovered by Nils G. Sefström 
thirty years later.4 
If a discovery is little known and exerts almost no 
impact on the scientific community, the rediscovery is 
more effective than the one with which the discovery 
is often associated. The useful concept of the “effective 
discovery of an element” was introduced by the Dan-
ish chemist Edmond Rancke-Madsen, who referred to 
the cases of hydrogen (Henry Cavendish, 1766), oxygen 
(Joseph Priestley, 1775) and chlorine (Carl W. Scheele, 
1774) as examples.5 According to Rancke-Madsen, for a 
scientist to be the effective discoverer of an element, he 
(or she) must have observed the existence of a new sub-
stance “which is different from earlier described sub-
stances, and this new substance is recognized by him or 
later by scientists as being elemental” (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the discovery of the new substance must have 
been announced publicly and attracted attention among 
contemporary scientists. Notice that according to this 
view, the effective discoverer does not need to have rec-
ognised the substance as an element; what matters is 
only that it was granted this status by later scientists and 
that this is still its status today. 
The notion of an effective discovery underlines that 
a discovery cannot be a private matter or limited to just 
a few persons. Not only must the discovery claim be 
publicly available, it must also be known and accepted 
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by at least a substantial part of the relevant scientific 
community. It must be communicated, usually in a jour-
nal article although it can also be in the form of a well-
publicized lecture or a press conference. The Swedish 
chemist and historian of chemistry Jan Trofast offers the 
following definition of the discovery of a chemical ele-
ment:
A discovery is established when the scientist has shown 
new properties of the new element in form of e.g. a number 
of salts and clearly and unambiguously shown that it is a 
new element. … Further the time of discovery is said to be 
when the first publication (could be in the form of a letter 
to a colleague) is available and not when the first observa-
tion is made or when the first suspicion was aroused in the 
laboratory.6
However, to include a private letter under the label 
“publication” is too wide an interpretation of the term. 
Communication by letter does not secure dissemination 
to the scientific community but at most to a few mem-
bers of it. Only in exceptional cases, namely if the let-
ter is copied or its content otherwise circulated to a large 
number of scientists, can this form of communication 
be of a public or semi-public nature. The scientist who 
makes an observation of something new, but reports it 
only in his diary or in a letter, has not made a discovery 
and that even though he may have recognised the nov-
elty and significance of what he has observed. According 
to Alan Gross, “There is no such thing as a private dis-
covery… A scientific discovery, then, is the public attri-
bution of novelty to a claim regarded by a relevant sci-
entific community as possible and as the consequence of 
following appropriate methods.”7 
Consider the case of plutonium which was identified 
in nuclear reactions by Glenn Seaborg and his team in 
late 1940 (Pu-238) and early 1941 (Pu-239). As a result of 
the unusual political circumstances of World War II the 
discovery paper submitted on 7 March 1941 to Physical 
Review, only appeared in print five years later.8 Although 
plutonium thus became publicly discovered only in 
1946, it is customary and reasonable to date the discov-
ery to the year 1941. Incidentally, in this case there was 
no priority controversy as the discovery was unanimous-
ly assigned to Seaborg and his collaborators. 
According to the individualist or “heroic” model of 
discovery widely favoured by scientists and journalists, 
one can identify the moment a discovery occurred and 
also the individual who should be credited. However, 
historical studies demonstrate that in many cases this is 
not possible and, generally, that the model is inadequate. 
Rather than focusing on the discovery itself some his-
torians and sociologists of science argue that what mat-
ters is not so much the discovery’s intellectual history as 
its social history. How and why does a discovery claim 
become accepted as a bona fide discovery by the scien-
tific community? According to this view discoveries are 
retrospective judgments which are socially defined and 
constructed. They are labels attributed post hoc to some 
discovery claims but not to others. As one author puts it, 
“Discoveries do not simply ‘occur’ or ‘happen’ naturalis-
tically, but are socially defined and recognized produc-
tions.”9
While the importance of the social history is beyond 
doubt in discovery studies, it does not follow that it 
offers a sufficient account of discoveries and their recep-
tions. Moreover, the social analysis is not incompatible 
with a more traditional, intellectual analysis. The two 
approaches are supplementary and none of them is suf-
ficient alone.
Discoveries are often thought to be purely empiri-
cal, meaning that the first observation of an object or 
phenomenon X constitutes the discovery of X. How-
ever, philosophers have long pointed out that this is too 
simplistic a view and that a discovery involves an active 
mental process as it relies on theoretical preconditions. 
A scientist may observe or perceive X without identi-
fying it as X. Or to put it differently, there is a crucial 
difference between “seeing that” and “seeing as.”10 For 
example, in experiments with iron and dilute strong 
acids Robert Boyle and other seventeenth-century chem-
ists observed an “air” without recognising it to be new 
or elemental. They observed what became known as 
hydrogen, but they did not discover hydrogen. This view 
is contrary to the one of Rancke-Madsen as cited above.
The idea that discoveries involve changes in the the-
oretical or conceptual framework was a leading theme 
in Thomas Kuhn’s influential essay dating from 1962. 
Using the discovery history of oxygen as a lead example 
Kuhn argued that “Observation and conceptualization, 
fact and assimilation of fact to theory, are inseparably 
linked in the discovery of scientific novelty.”11 Moreo-
ver, he distinguished between two classes of discovery, 
namely those which could be predicted from accepted 
theory in advance and those which could not. Kuhn 
found the second class – “discovery by accident” – to be 
more interesting, as this kind of discovery would typi-
cally force scientists to organise known data into a new 
conceptual framework. As a result an existing paradigm 
might be challenged and give rise to a revolutionary 
phase in science.  
With respect to discoveries of the first class, such as 
the elements predicted or anticipated from the periodic 
system, Kuhn wrote that “There have been few prior-
ity debates … and only paucity of data can prevent the 
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historian from ascribing them to a particular time and 
place.” However, this is definitely a misconception. After 
the acceptance of the periodic system the frequency 
of priority controversies did not diminish nor did they 
become less serious. On the contrary, conflicts of this 
kind rather increased in number and intensity.
3. CONTROVERSIES OVER PRIORITY
In his History and Present State of Electricity dating 
from 1767, Priestley suggested that “mistakes, misappre-
hensions, and altercations” should have no place in the 
annals of science. According to him, 
All the disputes which have no way contributed to the dis-
covery of truth, I would gladly consign to eternal oblivion. 
Did it depend upon me, it should never be known to pos-
terity, that there had ever been any such thing as envy, 
jealousy, or cavilling among the admirers of my favourite 
study.12
Yet it is all too clear that controversies of various 
kinds do play an important and often fruitful role in 
science and have always done so. They are sometimes 
instrumental in defining the disciplinary boundaries 
related to a new subfield, such as exemplified by the 
emergence of physical chemistry in the late nineteenth 
century.13
As Robert Merton pointed out in a pioneering paper 
of 1957, not only are controversies abundant they also 
contribute – contrary to what Priestley thought – to 
scientific progress.14 To be involved in a scientific con-
troversy whether as a winner or loser, may cause a loss 
in reputation, but this is not generally the case. Prior-
ity controversies, in particular, may have the effect of 
increasing the competitive pressure and forcing the par-
ticipants to study the subject in question more extensive-
ly and in greater depth than if the controversy had not 
existed. This kind of controversy goes far back in time, 
certainly to the age of Galileo if not earlier. One reason 
why the assignment of credit is important is that it helps 
in understanding the historical dynamics in the discov-
ery process. Assigning the wrong credit for a discovery 
may distort the picture of how and why the discovery 
occurred.
There is no generally accepted definition of a scien-
tific controversy, but it is useful to distinguish the con-
cept from other forms of communicative disagreement, 
such as debate, discussion, polemics and dispute.15 First, 
for a disagreement to qualify as a scientific controver-
sy, evidently it should centre on a scientific issue and 
involve scientists as key participants. While some con-
troversies are “pure,” meaning that they are concerned 
almost exclusively with scientific questions, others are 
“mixed.” The latter category refers to cases where politi-
cal, environmental and ethical concerns enter signifi-
cantly, such as the use of flame retardant chemicals.16 
Whether belonging to one class or the other, typi-
cally a controversy is of some duration, it is expressed 
in public, and it takes place by means of arguments 
and counterarguments. Contrary to what is the case in 
a debate or discussion, the parties involved in a contro-
versy must be committed to one of the opposing views. 
Being more than a quarrel between two individual sci-
entists a controversy involves the relevant scientific com-
munity, and it is only if the community considers the 
disagreement worth taking seriously that it will develop 
into a proper controversy. In some if not all cases major 
parts of the scientific community will be engaged on 
both sides of the disagreement, although often dispro-
portionally.
There are different kinds of controversies. Follow-
ing a proposal of Ernan McMullin, one may distinguish 
between controversies of fact, of theory, and of princi-
ple.17 In the present context dealing with element discov-
eries the first category is the most important. Here sci-
entists disagree on whether a claimed entity or property 
actually exists. Does the substance claimed to be a new 
chemical element really have the status of an element? 
The two other categories relate to different theoretical 
views and methodological principles, respectively. The 
three categories are not mutually exclusive and may in 
some cases appear together, such as was the case with 
the much-discussed discovery history of oxygen.18
Disputes over priority mostly concern either fac-
tual or theoretical disagreements as in the discovery 
of objects or theories. They may also be about names 
which, in the case of new elements, have often provoked 
controversy if of a different kind. The accepted name of 
an element may directly or indirectly refer to the dis-
coverer and thus suggest which scientist is to be credited 
with the discovery. Consider a scientist X who proposes 
the name A for a new element he claims to have found, 
while scientist Y independently finds what he names B 
and believes is the same element. In this case a dispute 
about the name reflects a controversy about discovery 
(see Section 6). Naming controversies have been com-
mon for the transuranic elements and in particular for 
those named after a scientist. The most controversial of 
the names was the one of element 106, seaborgium, but 
there were others as well.19 
As controversies appear in different forms, so they 
terminate in different ways. A controversy may be 
resolved, meaning that the two parties come to agree, by 
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means of scientific arguments, that one of the competing 
claims is after all superior to the other. The Irish chem-
ist Richard Kirwan had for long defended the phlogiston 
theory and criticized Lavoisier’s oxygen alternative, but 
in 1792 he gave in. “I lay down my arms and abandon 
the cause of phlogiston,” he wrote.20 A controversy may 
also terminate by withering away, perhaps by lack of 
interest or simply because the protagonists of one of the 
competing views disappear from the scene. Finally his-
torians and sociologists speak about termination by clo-
sure if political or other non-scientific factors force the 
controversy to end.
In most cases priority controversies take place 
simultaneously with the discovery claims and involve 
the competing scientists as the main contenders. But in 
other cases they emerge retrospectively many years after 
the contenders have passed away and the case apparently 
was closed. It may be that new data or historical sources 
come to the light of day, or that scientists re-examine the 
case and argue that X rather than Y should be credited 
with the discovery. As we shall see below, the discoveries 
of aluminium and lutetium are examples. 
Another and more recently discussed case concerns 
element 75, rhenium, which is credited work by Ida 
Tacke (later Noddack), Walter Noddack and Otto Berg 
in 1925. However, many years earlier the Japanese chem-
ist Masataka Ogawa believed to have found evidence for 
the element, which he called nipponium. By 1925 nip-
ponium was long forgotten, but as late as 2004 it was 
argued that Ogawa had indeed discovered the element.21 
To the extent that one can speak of a priority conflict in 
this rather unconvincing attempt of rehabilitation, it was 
constructed much post festum (see also Section 4).
4. AN OVERVIEW OF ELEMENT DISCOVERIES
It is generally agreed that phosphorus is the first ele-
ment with a known discovery history and discoverer. 
The earlier elements known to ancient cultures, such as 
sulphur, gold, silver and tin, were not discovered in any 
real sense (Figure 1). 
When the Hamburg merchant and alchemist Hen-
nig Brand in or about 1669 produced a white, waxy 
and luminous substance by distilling male urine and 
heating the remaining paste, he serendipitously dis-
covered phosphorus in the form P4 (Figure 2).22 But he 
did not, strictly speaking, discover the chemical ele-
ment phosphorus as neither he nor his contemporaries 
conceived the substance as an elementary body. Nor 
did Brand communicate his discovery publicly, in the 
form of a publication. Only in 1678 did the German 
chemist Johann Kunckel publish an account of the new 
substance and how to prepare it. Still a century after 
Brand’s discovery phosphorus was thought to be a com-
posite body, namely “a kind of sulphur composed of a 
particular acid united with phlogiston … [and which] 
resembles vitriolic sulphur also in this point that its 
phlogiston may be burnt, even with rapidity, without 
any decomposition of its acid.”23
Figure 1. Discoveries of chemical elements since 1650. Source: htt-
ps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Known-elements-1650-pre-
sent.png
Figure 2. Detail from Joseph Wright of Derby’s painting of 1771 
showing an alchemist discovering phosphorus. Source: https://
resobscura.blogspot.com/2017/06/urine-phosphorus-and-philoso-
phers-stone.html
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Although Brand’s work of 1669 does not live up to 
current philosophical, non-anachronistic ideas of what 
constitute an element discovery, somehow it seems arti-
ficial to deprive him of the credit of having discovered 
phosphorus. There was at the time a kind of priority 
controversy even though it did not concern phosphorus 
as an element but only as a new and exciting substance. 
Within a decade or two Brand faded into obscurity, his 
priority defended only by Leibniz. By the turn of the 
century priority had effectively been conferred to either 
Kunckel or his compatriot Johan Daniel Krafft.
The point is that according to the early chemists phos-
phorus was not elemental. A concept of chemical elements 
roughly similar to the modern one only arose in the 1780s, 
perhaps first stated by the German chemist Johann Gme-
lin.24 More famously and in greater detail it was stated by 
Antoine Lavoisier in his seminal treatise Traité Élemen-
taire de Chimie published in 1789. According to Lavoisier, 
phosphorus was an element or “simple substance,” mean-
ing that it could not be decomposed – or had not yet been 
decomposed – into still simpler bodies (Figure 3).
The later history of element discoveries may conveni-
ently be classified in four chronological phases, the first 
of which is associated with John Dalton’s atomic theory. 
The immediate importance of Dalton’s New System of 
Chemical Philosophy was not so much the atomic hypo- 
thesis as the idea to associate the relative weights of atoms 
with a measurable quantity, the atomic weight. As far as 
the concept of element was concerned, Dalton followed 
Lavoisier’s operational formula: “By elementary principles 
or simple bodies we mean such as have not been decom-
posed, but are found to enter into combination with other 
bodies.”25 With Jöns Jacob Berzelius’ staunch support of 
Dalton’s theory the establishment of still more precise 
atomic weights became a matter of prime concern. In 
1826 Berzelius published his final table of atomic weights. 
To him and many of his contemporaries the identifica-
tion of new elements relied on determinations of their 
atomic weights. Often credited as the discoverer of five 
new elements (cerium, selenium, silicon, zirconium, and 
thorium), Berzelius was eminently successful and his suc-
cesses depended to a large extent on his analytical skills 
in determining the elements’ atomic weights.26
Dmitri Mendeleev’s classification of elements in 
1869, which I take to be the beginning of phase two, 
rested crucially on the postulate that an element was 
defined by its atomic weight. In his Faraday lecture of 
1889 the Russian chemist pointed out that before the 
periodic system “there was no special reason to expect 
the discovery of new elements.” It was only the gaps in 
the sequence of atomic weights as organised in the peri-
odic system that “enabled us to perceive undiscovered 
elements at a distance which formerly was inaccessible to 
chemical vision, and long ere they were discovered.”27 
With the acceptance of the periodic system or table 
it came to define the possibility of new elements: If X has 
no place in the table, it cannot possibly be an element. 
The dogma was challenged with the discovery of argon 
and helium in the 1890s, but in this case order was rein-
stated by adding a new group of inert gases to the sys-
tem. Despite the authority of Mendeleev’s system, or the 
corresponding one of Lothar Meyer, chemists continued 
to suggest new elements. They sometimes hid them in 
the poorly understood group of rare earths and at other 
times they were just unconcerned with whether they fit-
ted into the system or not. Random examples are nebu-
lium, etherion and carolinium.28 Characteristically these 
discovery claims were rarely taken seriously.
Figure 3. Lavoisier’s table of “simple substances” in his Traité Élé-
mentaire de Chimie from 1789.
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In the third phase, starting with the introduction of 
isotopy and the atomic number Z in about 1913 it turned 
out that the atomic weight was not after all the defining 
property of an element.29 Yet the periodic system sur-
vived the redefinition of an element and the change of 
the elements’ ordinal number from the atomic weight 
to the atomic number. The latter quantity, as given by 
the charge of the atomic nucleus, could be measured by 
means of the method of X-ray spectroscopy pioneered by 
Henry Moseley. However, it took until 1923 before the 
new definition of an element was sanctioned by IUPAC, 
the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry. 
Whereas the periodic system did not originally restrict 
the number of possible elements, with the introduction 
of the atomic number the existence of elements lighter 
than hydrogen was ruled out. What had formerly been 
possible, if unlikely, now became impossible. On the 
other hand, the new understanding of the periodic sys-
tem did not preclude new elements heavier than urani-
um. In principle there might be any number of them.
The fourth and last phase in the history of element 
discoveries may be said to have started in 1937 with the 
manufacture and hence discovery of the first artificial 
element, soon to be followed by many transuranic ele-
ments. Technetium, the approved name of element 43, 
was discovered by the physicist Emilio Segré and the 
mineralogist Carlo Perrier by analysing a molybdenum 
target irradiated with deuterons and neutrons. There had 
earlier been several unconfirmed claims of having detect-
ed element 43 in nature, noticeably by the Noddack-
Tacke-Berg team which in 1925 claimed to have found 
small amounts of the element. This evolved into a pri-
ority controversy between “masurium” and technetium 
which much later was re-opened by scientists in favour 
of the masurium claim.30 The much delayed attempts to 
change the discovery history of element 43 were ignored 
by IUPAC and the large majority of chemists.  
5. THE THIRD-MOST COMMON ELEMENT
Given that aluminium makes up 8.1% of the Earth’s 
crust, it is remarkable that its discovery dates back less 
than 150 years. In the case of element 13 there was no 
major priority controversy, but there are other features in 
the history of the element that makes it instructive from 
a discovery perspective.31 It is generally agreed that the 
German chemist Andreas Sigismund Marggraf was the 
first to realise, in 1754, that there is a separate “earth” 
(alumina) in alum different from the one in limestone.32 
The still unknown earth appeared as “argile” in Lavoisi-
er’s table of 1789, with the author suggesting that it might 
be a metallic element saturated with oxygen. Attempts 
to isolate the metal in alumina made by Humphry Davy 
and later by Berzelius failed, although Berzelius was able 
to determine its atomic weight to 27.4. The element was 
known to exist and Davy had even coined a name for it, 
alumium or what later became aluminium, but it had not 
yet been discovered.
The main steps in the element’s discovery pro-
cess are well known and need only to be briefly reca-
pitulated. In early 1825 H. C. Ørsted, the discoverer of 
electromagnetism, reported to the Royal Danish Acad-
emy of Science a new method in which he transformed 
alumina (Al2O3) to anhydrous aluminium chloride and 
subsequently reduced it by means of potassium amalgam 
(Figure 4). The result was what Ørsted described as “a 
lump of metal resembling tin in colour and lustre.”33 The 
brief Danish report was abstracted in Schweigger’s Jour-
nal für Physik und Chemie and Poggendorff’s Annalen 
der Physik und Chemie, and in 1827 it appeared in a 
German translation in Berzelius’ Jahresbericht über die 
Fortschritte der physischen Wissenschaften.34 Nonethe-
less, it failed to attract interest. Ørsted, who did not find 
the method and the new element to be very important, 
never returned to the subject. In September 1827 young 
Friedrich Wöhler visited Ørsted, who told him about 
the metal and encouraged him to take a closer look at 
it. Back in Germany Wöhler was unable to confirm that 
Ørsted’s method yielded aluminium, but by using pure 
potassium as the reducing agent he produced the metal 
in the form of a grey powder. Wöhler came to believe 
that what Ørsted had thought was a lump of aluminium 
was instead a kind of alloy of aluminium and potassium.
In his discovery paper of 1827 Wöhler gave full 
credit to Ørsted for his discovery of aluminium chlo-
ride, carefully pointing out that he had no intention to 
exploit Ørsted’s pioneering work of 1825 or being dis-
Figure 4. The first step in Ørsted’s isolation of aluminium, the syn-
thesis of AlCl3. In modern nomenclature the process is Al2 O3+3C 
+3Cl2→3CO+2AlCl3. Reproduced from a Danish textbook of 1853 
(H. Westergård, Uorganisk Kemi).
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loyal. He mentioned that the Danish scientist “has indi-
rectly encouraged me to try to attain to further results 
myself.” Ørsted seems not to have cared about priority, 
and there was no rivalry between him and Wöhler. In 
1845 Wöhler was able to obtain aluminium in a com-
pact metallic if still impure form and to determine, 
for the first time, the metal’s principal properties. If 
Ørsted’s work of 1825 was the first birth of alumini-
um, and Wöhler’s of 1827 and 1845 marked the second 
birth, the third birth dates from 1854 when Henri Saint-
Claire Deville found a new method to produce the metal 
in pure form. It was only with Deville’s work that alu-
minium became a useful metal and not a mere chemical 
curiosity.
Deville never claimed to have discovered alumini-
um, an honour he fully ascribed to Wöhler, and yet in 
France he was widely and in part for national reasons 
considered the true discoverer.35 As to Ørsted’s role in 
the discovery process, Deville simply ignored it. In his 
influential book De l’Aluminium from 1859, the first 
comprehensive work on the history and use of the new 
metal, there is no mention of Ørsted. For most of a cen-
tury Wöhler was recognised as the one and only discov-
erer of aluminium, whereas Ørsted’s earlier synthesis 
was generally considered to be wrong or incomplete, 
perhaps an anticipation of aluminium but not an isola-
tion of the metal. 
However, on the occasion of the centenary of the 
discovery of electromagnetism Danish chemists recon-
sidered Ørsted’s method and reconstructed the old 
experiments to establish whether or not aluminium had 
been obtained back in 1825. The result of this attempt 
to rewrite history was that in all likelihood Ørsted had 
isolated impure aluminium two years before Wöhler, 
a conclusion in which there clearly was an element of 
national pride. It is about time, wrote the distinguished 
chemist Niels Bjerrum, “to reinstate Ørsted as the first 
who obtained aluminium.”36 Contrary to the earlier 
mentioned case of element 75 (Section 3), in this case 
the attempt of rehabilitation succeeded to some extent. 
According to Harry Holmes, an American chemist, “It 
is now in order for the world to atone for the injustice 
by giving the Dane credit for the discovery.”37 Not all 
chemists and historians agree, but today it is not uncom-
mon to name Ørsted as the discoverer of aluminium or 
to share the credit between him and Wöhler.
So, when was aluminium discovered and to whom 
should priority be allocated? As indicated in Section 2, 
the question is misguided as it presupposes an answer 
in terms of a definite year and a definite discoverer. 
A summary of the discovery process may provide the 
only appropriate answer: In 1754 Marggraf recognised 
a special “earth” in alum which subsequently became 
known as an element and prepared by Ørsted in 1825 in 
an impure form; two years later Wöhler produced alu-
minium as metallic powder and in 1845 he determined 
its density and some other properties; finally, in 1854 
Deville created pure aluminium and laid the base for its 
industrial use. 
6. LUTETIUM, A CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENT
Contrary to the case of aluminium, the discovery of 
the rare earth element 71, lutetium, involved a series of 
convoluted priority controversies concerning scientific 
as well as external issues. Although disputes about fact 
entered the controversy, it was basically about priority. 
For a long time the number of rare earths and their posi-
tion in the periodic system was a matter of confusion and 
dispute, a situation which was only settled in the mid-
1920s. The uncertainty resulted in several premature or 
wrong discovery claims of which “celtium” as a candidate 
for element 72 has received much attention by historians 
of science. As it turned out in 1923, element 72 (hafni-
um) is not a rare earth but a homologue to titanium and 
zirconium.38 The case of element 71 is closely connected 
with the celtium-hafnium controversy but started earlier, 
at a time when a chemical element was still defined by 
its atomic weight. The controversy over this element took 
place in two separate phases, originally around 1908 and 
with a second round in 1923. It provides one more exam-
ple of how later research may throw new light on the his-
tory of the discovery of elements.
The ytterbium earth isolated by Jean C. G. Marig-
nac in 1878 was generally accepted as a chemical element 
for more than two decades, but in 1907 two chemists, 
Georges Urbain in France and Carl Auer von Welsbach 
in Austria, independently concluded that ytterbium con-
tained a hitherto unknown element. Urbain reported his 
finding to the Paris Academy of Science on 4 November 
1907, whereas Auer presented his full report to the Vien-
na Academy six weeks later (but had stated his claim in 
preliminary communications of 1905 and 1906; Figure 5). 
While Urbain named the new element lutecium 
(Lu), and proposed neo-ytterbium (Ny) for the more 
dominant element corresponding to Marignac’s ytter-
bium, Auer suggested the names cassiopeium (Cp) 
and aldebaranium (Ad). Both chemists claimed prior-
ity and immediately engaged in a heated controversy.39 
For example, at one stage Auer accused his French rival 
of foul play, to which Urbain indignantly responded: 
“[Auer] goes as far as accusing me of simply plagiariz-
ing him. … It is disgraceful of Mr. Auer v. Welsbach to 
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make such accusations against his colleagues.”40
Without going into further details, in 1909 the 
International Committee on Atomic Weights decided in 
favour of Urbain’s priority, primarily because he was the 
first to publish an atomic weight for what now became 
lutecium and since 1949, lutetium. Several years later 
Auer unexpectedly got a second chance. 
In the wake of the celtium-hafnium dispute scien-
tists at Niels Bohr’s institute in Copenhagen investigated 
anew Auer’s cassiopeium by means of optical spectros-
copy and compared the result with Urbain’s spectrum 
of celtium from 1911. From this they concluded not only 
that celtium anno 1911 was nothing but element 71, but 
also that Urbain’s original sample of lutetium contained 
much less of the element than Auer’s cassiopeium. Con-
sequently the Copenhagen scientists initiated a cam-
paign to reinstate the Austrian chemist as the discoverer 
of element 71. The campaign succeeded in so far that the 
German Atomic Weight Commission gave full credit to 
Auer in 1923, but IUPAC maintained the name lutetium, 
or rather lutecium, and Urbain’s priority. 
Contrary to what is often stated in the chemical lit-
erature, Urbain’s claim of having discovered lutetium in 
1907 rested on a somewhat shaky foundation. Element 
71 was undoubtedly discovered this year, but it might be 
just as reasonable to credit Auer with the discovery and 
relegate Urbain as an independent co-discoverer. The 
International Committee’s decision to honour Urbain 
was based on incomplete information and an interpre-
tation of available data favourable to Urbain’s claim.41 A 
contributing reason may have been that in 1909 Urbain 
served as chairman of the International Committee, 
the other members being Wilhelm Ostwald, Frank 
W. Clarke and Thomas Thorpe. Finally, the American 
chemist Charles James is sometimes mentioned as an 
independent discoverer or co-discoverer of lutetium, 
but since James did not publish his discovery and nev-
er pushed his own claim, this is unjustified.42 He could 
have discovered the element, but did not.
7. NOBELIUM, ELEMENT 102
The manufacture of many of the transuranic ele-
ments, and especially those with atomic numbers 
between 100 and 113, has given rise to controversies 
regarding identification, name and priority. A notewor-
thy example is element 102, nobelium, which was first 
claimed discovered in 1957 but only received official 
recognition by IUPAC 35 years later.43 The controversy, 
which was primarily concerned with whether priority 
belonged to teams of American or Russian scientists, has 
certain features in common with the earlier controversy 
over element 72. As the latter controversy was coloured 
by the international political climate in the early 1920s, 
so the controversy over element 102 included external 
factors reflecting the political atmosphere of the Cold 
War era.
But it started with a third group of contenders, 
namely an international team working at the Nobel 
Institute of Physics in Stockholm and consisting of four 
Swedes, two Britons and one American. In 1957 the team 
announced that it had detected element 102 by bombard-
ing a sample of curium (Z = 96) with ions of carbon-13. 
As regards the name of the element the Stockholm sci-
entists suggested to call it nobelium in honour of Alfred 
Figure 5. Carl Auer von Welsbach. Source: https://commons.wiki-
media.org/wiki/File:Carl_Auer_von_Welsbach_1910.jpg
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Nobel. The discovery claim created much attention in 
Swedish and British news media, not least because it was 
the first transuranic element discovered in Europe. At the 
time nuclear syntheses of heavy elements was a monop-
oly of two research groups, one associated with the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, and the other with the 
Dubna nuclear research facility in Russia. None of the 
groups accepted the news from Stockholm and they were 
unable to reproduce the claimed results.
Even though the Swedish-led discovery claim turned 
out to be unfounded, this was only the beginning of a 
much longer priority controversy involving American 
and Russian scientists as competitors. The discovery 
story of nobelium has been called “the most convoluted 
and misunderstood of all [the discovery stories of] the 
transfermiums.”44 In short, the Berkeley team led by 
Albert Ghiorso first claimed to have produced the ele-
ment in 1958, but the Dubna team vehemently denied 
the claim and argued that, “Element 102 was discovered 
at Dubna in studies carried out during 1963-1966. Those 
papers contain unambiguous and complete evidence 
for the synthesis of its nuclei.”45 Ghiorso and his col-
laborators (including the Nobel laureate Glenn Seaborg) 
responded by criticizing the Russian results and main-
taining the validity of their own work. 
Somewhat strangely, element 102 is still named nobe-
lium and thus refers to a discovery claim that was known 
to be wrong or at least highly insufficient. Although nei-
ther the Americans nor the Russians accepted the claim, 
none of them suggested a different name. Nobelium had 
quickly entered textbooks and periodic tables, and in 
1961 IUPAC approved the name and symbol without 
evaluating the validity of the Stockholm experiments. For 
a while the Russians used the name “joliotium,” a refer-
ence to the French nuclear physicist Frédéric Joliot (or 
Joliot-Curie), but the name never caught on.46 It is not 
irrelevant to mention that Joliot was a devoted commu-
nist and staunch supporter of the Soviet Union.
To take care of the many priority disputes IUPAC 
and IUPAP (International Union of Pure and Applied 
Physics) established in 1985 a joint Transfermium Work-
ing Group (TWG) consisting of nuclear physicists and 
chemists. After a review of all relevant papers on ele-
ment 102, in a report of 1992 the TWG concluded in 
favour of the Dubna team whereas it found that the 
Berkeley experiments did not qualify as a discovery. The 
decision caused strong reactions from the Americans 
who not only charged that the TWG panel was incom-
petent but also that it was biased in favour of the Dub-
na claim. But IUPAC accepted the TWG report, mean-
ing that the Russian nuclear physicist Georgii Flerov 
(or Georgy Flyorov) and his team were approved as dis-
coverers of element 102 (Figure 6). This was not quite 
the end of it, though, for Ghiorso and Seaborg restated 
their case in “an appeal to the historians of science to 
reread the cited literature and perhaps, belatedly, to reas-
sign credit.” If they could not get full credit they would 
accept “in the spirit of glasnost” to share it with the Rus-
sians.47 But the appeal was ineffective. The controversy 
terminated by a mixture of resolution and closure.
The TWG panel was acutely aware that an assign-
ment of priority for having discovered an element can-
not be separated from a definition of what constitutes a 
discovery. The chosen and agreed-upon definition was 
simply that the discovery of a chemical element is an 
experiment which convincingly demonstrates “the exist-
ence of a nuclide with an atomic number Z not identi-
fied before.” The TWG panel further reflected on the his-
torical importance of element discoveries:
The centuries-old history of the definition and discovery 
of chemical elements has a deep scientific and general fas-
cination. … The problem is open although of final scope, 
unlike the number of continents upon the surface of the 
earth where we know with certainty that none still awaits 
discovery. These considerations give to the discovery of new 
elements an importance, an allure and a romance that 
does not attach to the discovery of, say, a new comet or 
a new beetle where many more such discoveries are to be 
anticipated in the future.48
The TWG comment related to the synthetic elements 
produced at the end of the twentieth century, but it 
could as well have been written by chemists at the time 
of Mendeleev. 
Figure 6. Russian stamp of 2013 dedicated to G. Flerov after whom 
element 114, flerovium, is named. Flerov was also head of the 
research team credited with the discovery of nobelium. Source: htt-
ps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RUSMARKA-1660.jpg
89Priority Disputes and the Discovery of Chemical Elements
8. CONCLUSION
Although there are today formal criteria for the dis-
covery of a new element, and for assigning priority to 
the discovery, these are not applicable to many discover-
ies in the past. The relevant criteria depend on the his-
torical period and so do the accepted rules for priority. 
It seems hardly possible to come up with a fixed defini-
tion of element discovery which makes sense over the 
approximately 250 years during which chemists have 
searched for new elements. The search has often given 
rise to priority controversies, a phenomenon one can 
find throughout history and independent of whether 
or not the discovery was guided by theoretical expecta-
tions. To understand these and other controversies relat-
ed to the discovery of new elements, one needs to adopt 
the norms and rules of the period in question and not 
those of a later time. In this essay I have also pointed out 
that accepted discovery histories may retrospectively be 
questioned and revised. At least in principle it is possible 
that a future list of element discoveries will differ signifi-
cantly from the one accepted today.
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